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CHAPTER ONE 
From the Welfare State
to the Militarized Market 
Losing Choices, Controlling Losers 
Martha T. McCluskey 
By the end of the twentieth century, the ideology of the free market was a power­
ful force pushing back against the growth of the welfare state both in the United 
States and around the globe. According to that ideology, welfare state policies 
spread neither prosperity nor security, but instead sacrificed individual free­
dom for government control. That story contrasts the welfare state with a free 
market where individuals rule by exercising the power to choose. In that storied 
market, decentralized voluntary exchanges based on competitive calculations 
of individual gain add up to maximize overall resources, so that individual self­
 interest benefits society as a whole. This idea helped justify a triumphant wave 
of neoliberal policies claiming to unleash market risk and reward from egalitar­
ian government regulation and spending (Yergin and Stanislaw 2002). 
This chapter aims to help clarify the ideas challenging economic equality 
and the possibilities for resisting those ideas by analyzing how the free market 
story connects freedom of choice with unequal government control. The story 
of market freedom has helped present neoliberalism’s increased insecurity and 
upward distribution of economic gains as temporary bumps on a new road to­
ward broad peace and prosperity rather than a sign of timeworn class politics. 
Even as those bumps have grown to full- fledged economic crisis, following on 
the heels of new waves of global political violence, the free market story retains 
substantial power to resist new commitments to welfare state policies. 
Alongside this neoliberal ideology and policy, a growing neoconservative 
movement in the United States has also challenged the late twentieth- century 
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28 • Martha T. McCluskey 
welfare state through policies emphasizing forceful government moral control, 
not public economic support, as the key to security and long- term political 
free dom (Steinfels 1979). That moralistic authoritarianism was oft en presented 
in opposition to market freedom, attributed in part to divisions between liber­
tarian economics and communitarian morality within U.S. conservativism, or 
between modernism and parochialism abroad. 
But to the contrary, the prevailing free market ideology is itself grounded in 
an embrace of expansive collective coercion and control that dovetails with the 
more overtly authoritarian critique of welfare state policies. Market and moral 
fundamentalism together support and legitimate a new vision where both po­
litical liberty and economic security are denied to most people. Free market 
ideology works to transform the idea of the democratic rule of law for the ben­
efit of the people to the rule of force for enhancing the wealth of a few. 
Two rhetorical steps have grounded the ideological formula justifying the 
move from democratic governance to the rule of a militarized market. First, 
inegalitarian policies that enforce losing choices for most are rationalized on the 
grounds that these market policies promote freedom of choice. Second, welfare 
state policies are identifi ed with market losers whose security threatens others’ 
winnings, so that these losers need securing as much as security. 
To some extent, the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 burst the 
popular and political illusion of individual choice bringing social abundance, 
instead revealing a reality of immense and indiscriminate loss bearing down 
from the mysterious and interdependent actions of an elite minority. The crisis 
has also increased attention to the threat of market “winners” and their dispro­
portionate and destructive government power, potentially replacing or defl ect­
ing efforts to scapegoat and police the growing number of market “losers.” 
Yet this period of crisis and change also has brought enhanced opportunities 
for wealthy elites to consolidate antidemocratic government power over others 
as the way to restore market freedom and political security. Even in the face of 
spectacular failures, the militarized market ideal retains substantial ideological 
and institutional power to make increased economic security and democratic 
freedom appear to be too costly. In a well- honed rhetorical formula, propo­
nents of the militarized market construct the bad choices they have bequeathed 
as the best of all possible worlds, explaining newly constrained choices and 
horrific losses as the price of natural scarcity that must be paid to avoid further 
destruction. As legal structures continue to provide unequal security against 
loss, growing popular fear, despair, and distrust may produce pressure for con­
centrated authority backed by force in place of broad participation in shared 
economic and political power.
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As the global financial crisis unravels the proclaimed “freedom” of the fun­
damentalist market, uncovering its dependence on lavish government support 
and extensive private fraud, the rule of law needs to be revised as well as the 
rule of markets. A crucial step toward undoing the militarized market will be to 
restructure its rules to turn around the power to control economic choices so 
that more people will be winners. In addition, replacing market fundamental­
ism requires a shift from authoritarian control over market losers to democratic 
control over the current market “choosers,” whose gains depend on imposing 
staggering losses on others. 
LEGALIZING THE WELFARE STATE 
The United States’ move toward a welfare state in the first half of the twentieth 
century grew out of a similar ideological and legal struggle over the question 
of whether democratic controls on unequal economic power foster or hinder 
a free society. Prior to 1937, Supreme Court decisions during what has come 
to be called the Lochner era used the two- pronged rhetoric about choice and 
control to block many legislative efforts to promote economic security for the
nonwealthy.
First, the Lochner era opinions defined democratic efforts to change eco­
nomic rights and policies as a move from individual freedom to government 
intervention. Judges claimed that by striking down labor or consumer pro­
tections, such as minimum wage and maximum hour legislation, they were
enforcing a constitutional right to freedom of contract. For example, in the 
Lochner ruling, the Court decreed that constitutional freedom meant enforcing 
an individual baker’s right to “choose” to work long hours at low wages in un­
healthy conditions without government regulation (Lochner v. New York 1905). 
Through this reasoning, the courts constructed the political power of workers 
and other economically vulnerable groups to create diff erent, and arguably bet­
ter choices, as eff orts to take away choice. 
The key to reconstructing constrained choice as free choice was masking the 
pervasive and powerful role of existing law—and government coercion—in re­
stricting workers’ or consumers’ choices and privileging the wealthy. Any real-
world market choice does not simply reflect the chooser’s individual desires, 
but instead depends on others’ willingness and ability to satisfy that desire and 
on the price of that satisfaction compared to other alternatives. What particular 
options, at what prices, are available to a given worker, consumer, or entrepre­
neur will, of course, depend on the context, and in particular on how the law 
distributes and regulates property and power. The baker who chooses to labor 
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long hours at low wages to increase his income makes that choice against, for 
example, a backdrop of law that gives the owner of the bakery rather than the 
bakery worker the title to the profits made from the sale of the bread, along 
with a backdrop of government force that gives that owner the right to call the 
police if the bakery worker pockets the money from that sale (Hale 1952). Regu­
lations of wages and hours only appear to be coercive government intervention
in a free market by obscuring the background legal systems, such as the rules 
of corporate finance, property, tort, and contract and criminal justice, so that 
these laws governing the existing market appear to represent a state of nature
affording perfect free choice (Sunstein 1987). 
Second, the Lochner era opinions also supported an era of substantial gov­
ernment control over vulnerable individuals by tending to define those seeking 
more egalitarian government economic protections as dependent; that is, as 
persons incapacitated from freedom, authority, and self- suffi  ciency (McClus­
key 2003). This characterization could sometimes justify government protec­
tion for some of those most at risk of losing out in the market. For example, the 
Lochner era judiciary upheld minimum wage laws when applied to women, but 
not to men (Muller v. Oregon 1908). This reasoning tended to mark those who 
sought egalitarian economic protection as second- class and suspect citizens de­
serving of extensive government control along with only meager or even illu­
sory protection. For example, wage and hour limits that applied only to women 
tended to work to enhance their economic marginality, enforcing low incomes 
and exclusion from mainstream employment (Kessler- Harris 2001). When 
workers successfully asserted their collective choice for better wages and work 
conditions through supposedly private market bargaining by striking against 
employers, federal courts often issued injunctions authorizing military inter­
vention, thereby treating workers’ potential market freedom as unjust coercion 
of more deserving market winners (Casebeer 1995). 
As part of the New Deal’s dramatic shift in ideology and policy, prevailing 
jurisprudence repudiated Lochner’s market fundamentalism and opened the 
door to the twentieth- century welfare and regulatory state. By the end of the 
1930s, the U.S. Supreme Court had rejected the idea that fundamental freedom 
requires barring democratic policy measures aimed at advancing economic 
equality. In undoing Lochner’s jurisprudence, courts partly rejected the opposi­
tion between market choice and government coercion, instead reconstructing 
expanded state and federal legislative and executive power as the product of 
democratic political freedom (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 1947). The 
Court affirmed that the power to choose could mean not just the individual 
freedom to decide whether the personal benefits of a particular job or product 
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outweighed the costs, but also the freedom to assert collective power in state or 
market to change the costs and benefits of particular decisions, thereby produc­
ing a different, better array of choices for many. 
Nonetheless, the United States’ renunciation of Lochner’s market fundamen­
talism also served in part to reframe and legitimize many aspects of a milita­
rized market ideal. The prevailing explanation of Lochner’s mistake was that it
wrongly made economic policies integral to political and civil rights, not that 
it wrongly enforced a political economy with rules skewed to keep many from 
political and economic power (Sunstein 1987). As a result, U.S. law stopped 
short of joining the global trend to constitutionalize rights that would have
gone further to define economic and political power for nonelites as funda­
mental to meaningful freedom (Sunstein 2006). 
DELEGITIMIZING THE WELFARE STATE 
Losing Choices 
Although this post-Lochner separation of economics from basic political and 
civil rights enabled the growth of a (limited) U.S. welfare state, it also set the 
stage for its weakening in the late twentieth century. While government policies 
promoting economic equality usually were not directly blocked by the Consti­
tution, neither were many policies and institutions promoting the inegalitarian 
and coercive concentration of economic and political power. By constructing 
basic democratic freedom and equality in terms of government’s abstention
from disturbing a presumptively neutral process of politics and market, the pre­
vailing legal framework has often continued the Lochner era’s naturalization of 
extensive unequal losses and dangerous losers in need of control. If the process 
of producing winners and losers in state and market is viewed as generally free, 
then those who win will generally be seen to have made better choices, giving 
them deserved authority to harness further power in market and all branches 
of government to protect and enhance their gains. 
The ideological definition of freedom as minimized government control 
of economics contains a paradox. If true freedom equals unconstrained self-
interest maximizing in a harsh world of zero- sum competition for scarce re­
sources, then the most freedom will come from imposing the most constraint 
on others. The rational way to win an ideal competition for scarce resources 
will not necessarily or normally be to choose the option that maximizes one’s 
own benefits within given resource constraints. Instead, self- interested mar­
ket actors will seek to get better choices by using public and private power to 
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constrain others. By rejecting fundamental constitutional protection for broad-
based economic security and equitable economic power, the post- Lochner legal 
system set the stage for winners to build and concentrate gains by creating and 
controlling more market (and state) losers. In a legal system that denies the 
connections between economic power and political freedom, these constraints 
on others’ choices will tend to be legitimated and protected as neutral politics, 
economics, and law. Manipulating the imagined line between free market and 
coercive politics is one of the most powerful ways of gaining market power to
limit others’ choices. 
By the late twentieth century, wealthy elites used the rhetoric of market 
freedom to help mobilize a broader coalition against the welfare state vision 
spurred by the New Deal and expanded in new regulatory systems and gov­
ernment social programs in the 1960s through the early 1970s (Phillips- Fein 
2009). This coalition succeeded in weakening law reforms, establishing new le­
gal rights for corporations, controlling regulatory agencies, influencing the ju­
diciary, and building new political, academic, and legal institutions to advance 
elite business interests. Indeed, this mobilization has helped to reestablish some 
substantive constitutional protections for concentrated wealth in the guise of
basic due process and neutrality (McCluskey 2007). 
This legal context has helped give material substance to the ideological 
claim that the bad choices facing existing market losers are the tragic result 
of scarce economic resources, not the unjust result of unequal political power. 
For example, changes in the regulation of international trade and finance in the 
1970s through the 1990s helped increase the mobility and volatility of capital 
in relation to workers and communities. Those changes in background laws 
helped make collective action for better wages—either through legislation or 
labor organizing—a costlier choice more likely to risk capital flight (to jurisdic­
tions with less state labor protection), and thereby jeopardize jobs and wages 
for those workers and communities. 
Conservative activists harnessed this real (but contingent and political) in­
crease in scarcity to further advance the free market story. That story explained 
that the only way to effectively resist this scarcity is to further loosen the con­
straints on the market winners with the power to control the limited resources 
on which others increasingly depend. In this view, workers, communities, and 
nations faced with capital flight can only retain jobs or wealthy taxpayers, for 
example, by further shifting taxes and market risk to those without the power 
to transfer assets elsewhere, or by further directing government spending and 
regulatory support to protect investors rather than schools, the environment, 
public health, general infrastructure, or social services (Enrich 1996). Although 
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promoted by conservatives, this story has convinced many across the political 
spectrum in the United States since it exposes the real economic insecurity 
perceived by many of the middle class in the late twentieth century. 
But the argument that this market scarcity is inevitable, and inevitably per­
petuated by market winners, is essentially an argument about power couched 
in the language of impersonal, objective forces of economic incentives. If the 
power to control others’ choices is a natural, fi xed, infinitely resilient force, and 
if that mysterious suprahuman irresistible force is called the market, then we
have little choice but to give in to the bad choices dictated by that market and 
even to give that market more power to control our choices. By reifying the 
power to control others’ choices, this idea of the market ironically makes those 
bad and worse choices seem to be the route toward the best choices possible. If
the existing distribution of power to reap gains and avoid costs is inevitable and 
natural, then accommodating that power will be the best option, since resisting 
it will bring only further costs to those who lack that power. The credibility of 
the free market story’s promise of eventual abundance, in the face of increasing 
scarcity, depends on trusting that this unequal market power is nonetheless suf­
fi ciently diffuse and its concentrated gain so big that it eventually will spill over 
to a significant number of others. 
Controlling Losers 
Welfare states and their beneficiaries have often taken political and economic 
action to push back against neoliberalism’s losing choices. Yet welfare states 
are under attack not just from neoliberal policies increasing global economic 
competition, but also from renewed global assertions of overt and covert public 
and private force that often have enabled a wealthy few to extract gains from the 
majority of others. 
As the U.S. economy, and its wealthy business owners and investors, be­
came more threatened under global competition and increased nonelite po­
litical power in the 1960s and 1970s, the prevailing policy response has been 
not simply to win that competition by producing more and better economic 
goods, but to enlist militarism and government control to change the global 
and domestic rules of the game in the favor of the wealthy. As Chilean dictator 
Pinochet explained in a 1979 speech written by his “Chicago Boys” free mar­
ket economic advisors, democracy is only an expendable means to the more
important end of absolute economic freedom; or, as writer Eduardo Galeano 
observed, Pinochet was “torturing people so prices could be free” (Grandin 
2006, 175). 
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Historian Greg Grandin explains how free market ideology ironically helped 
promote a U.S. policy of heightened intervention through terror that brought 
mass poverty, violence, and dictatorship to much of Latin America during the 
late twentieth century (Grandin 2006). Many of the democratic welfare states 
or egalitarian political movements that grew around the globe after the fall of
colonialism and World War II lost ground or failed in signifi cant part because 
they appeared too powerful in that global competition, not too weak. Gran­
din argues that U.S. leaders inverted moral rhetoric about democratic freedom, 
joining moral and market fundamentalism, to justify military intervention that 
undermined the choice to increase economic and political equality in Latin 
American countries through the 1980s. In that period, the United States helped 
prevent El Salvador from becoming a more democratic, egalitarian, and eco­
nomically successful state not simply by promoting free market ideas, but also 
by spending over a million dollars a day for a decade to support a military 
counterinsurgency operating through what a 1991 U.S. Defense Department re­
port called “lavish brutality”—death squads willing and able to murder thou­
sands of people (Grandin 2006, 71, 98, 105). These Latin American policies 
have served as a model for foreign policy in the Middle East, where loft y claims 
of promoting democracy and free market prosperity have been accompanied 
by the pillaging of resources and assets, rampant violence, and infrastructure 
destruction along with new systems of military rule backed by murder, torture, 
extra- legal detention, and long- term foreign occupation. 
Within the United States, criminalization has long been used to control those 
whose occasional market winnings have been contrary to the moral order. The 
combined rise of market and moral ideology constructing poverty as the result 
of bad choices has helped to rationalize the growth of government control over 
those whose winnings threaten to undermine the gains of market elites. In the 
1980s and 1990s, new policies of mass incarceration placed large numbers of 
poor people of color under militarized control, often for participating in the 
illegal drug market in the absence of better alternatives for jobs or family care. 
In addition, this growth of the criminal justice industry increased economic 
and political pressure on government to further divert government spending 
from social support for better choices to authoritarian control of choice. This 
criminalization of poverty has contributed to an escalating system of public 
and private violence in poor communities. Incarceration leaves many families 
and communities without access to support necessary for legitimate market 
success, thereby encouraging further dependence on violent gangs and illegal 
activity. 
In addition to incarceration, the withdrawal of welfare support for poor 
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mothers has subjected many poor families of color to the public control of the 
child welfare system, as children subject to unsafe communities and poverty 
are removed to the sometimes violent and often inadequately supported fos­
ter care system. Criminalization and militarization of immigration, combined 
with neoliberal policies driving many outside the United States to illegal migra­
tion and many employers within the United States to rely on cheaper or more 
vulnerable immigrant labor, has meant that work opportunities often lead to 
state detention and policing along with private denial of rights. 
These policies of force and insecurity can nonetheless appear as beacons 
of freedom and opportunity through an ideological lens that dismisses and 
justifies this force and devastation as marginal or temporary side eff ects to
those whose failures prove their moral and economic inferiority. In contrast, 
decreased policing and decriminalization of unlawful cost- shift ing by power­
ful economic winners is excused by market and moral ideology romanticizing 
their gains as a sign of superior power, or rationalized as the inevitable price of
encouraging entrepreneurial risk- taking and ambition that will lead to long­
 term prosperity.
Losing Choice and Control in Welfare Reform 
One key symbol of the late twentieth- century ideological turn away from the 
welfare state to the free market (and to moral conservatism) was the 1996 fed­
eral legislation eliminating Aid to Families with Dependent Children (afdc). 
Examining the role of choice and control in the political debate about this 
symbol of welfare reform sheds light on the reasoning that naturalizes govern­
ment enforcement of losing choices and control over losers as enhanced market 
 freedom. 
The former afdc program, which grew out of the New Deal’s Social Secu­
rity Act and was significantly expanded in the 1960s, provided an alternative 
to work income for impoverished single parents (mostly mothers). In its place, 
Congress established a new program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Fami­
lies (tanf), which made access to benefits not a matter of individual right, but 
contingent on discretionary allocations from federal block grants to states (Per­
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996). This 
federal funding was subject to state compliance with a number of requirements 
designed to limit individual benefits, to move recipients into the workplace, to 
encourage marriage, and to discourage teenaged single parenting (Handler and 
Hasenfeld 1997). 
In the prevailing political view, these restrictions increased individual op­
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portunity for meaningful choice by replacing afdc’s policy of dependency 
on government benefits with a policy of market participation. Policy experts 
and popular opinion both held that government income support had, in fact, 
harmed impoverished single mothers and their children by distorting their 
choices about work, marriage, and family (Mead 2001). Indeed, afdc tended 
to offer poor families losing choices. Not only were benefi ts often too low to 
sustain families in the short run, but also those benefits could hinder oppor­
tunities for long- term security because they were conditioned on low income 
levels that generally precluded formal work or marriage to a worker. As a result, 
many single mothers felt compelled to supplement this aid with informal work 
and family relationships that could exacerbate their economic instability, their 
exclusion from mainstream opportunities, and their vulnerability to violence 
or addiction. 
But beyond the rhetoric of increased “work opportunity” (used in the title 
of the tanf legislation), in its design and implementation tanf has tended 
to produce tightened government control of single mothers in poverty, leav­
ing many with much worse options. The change to tanf has restricted access 
to government income support that could sometimes provide an alternative 
source of income to single mothers seeking to escape harmful jobs, harmful 
child care, or harmful intimate relationships. By limiting that alternative (or 
making it more costly to access), tanf tends to give impoverished single moth­
ers even less power than afdc to hold out for better choices for work and fam­
ily (McCluskey 2003). 
By identifying formal wage work with a naturalized market and government 
welfare with perverse politics, free market ideology helped present that shift 
from bad to worse choices as a move toward legitimate freedom and oppor­
tunity for single mothers in poverty. Advocates of welfare reform character­
ized government income support for impoverished families as redistribution 
that shifts the real market costs of having and raising children onto those who 
do not voluntarily choose to assume those costs—that is, taxpayers, many of
whom are struggling working parents themselves (McCluskey 2005). This view 
led to the conclusion that the high costs of work for single mothers (such as 
poor child care, low wages, high commuting expenses, or poor health) are a 
problem of irresponsible personal choices to bear and raise children without 
first establishing economic security (Solinger 2002). 
This logic about responsible choice also rationalized tanf’s increase in pu­
nitive regulation of welfare recipients’ behavior. Government controls on indi­
vidual choice, such as caps on benefits designed to reduce family size, marriage 
incentives, or workfare requirements, seem to be a way to increase responsible
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personal choice by ensuring that recipients pay what are deemed to be the real 
market costs of single parenting. In this view, social and legal structures that 
privatize much of the responsibility for raising children to gendered and un­
paid work within the family are presumed to be natural and normal systems 
of voluntary choice. Similarly, this view presents jobs with low wages and poor 
working conditions as normal and necessary features of the labor market. This 
picture thereby obscures how low- wage work is produced by government poli­
cies protecting the interests of employers and investors—such as the failure to 
adjust the minimum wage to keep up with inflation, or the failure to vigorously 
enforce antidiscrimination laws, or legal barriers to robust unionization. By 
obscuring the policies that help make single parenthood so costly, the use of
government power to force single mothers to personally bear the high costs 
of combining work and family can seem not only to enhance their own free­
dom, but to expand other people’s choices. In the free market story, replacing 
government redistribution with efficient pricing maximizes overall growth, so 
that welfare reform could be perceived as a way of enhancing middle- class job 
opportunities rather than creating more low- wage competition, which is likely 
to depress wages. 
In response to these free market arguments, advocates of more generous 
welfare support oft en portrayed welfare recipients as incapable of free choice. 
Instead of challenging the assumptions of the naturalized market, these argu­
ments attempted to place single mothers outside of its reach by emphasizing the 
degree to which jobs, husbands, or meaningful birth control are unavailable, 
or the degree to which impoverished women or children lack the knowledge 
or freedom from others’ control to make choices that rationally advance their 
interest (Graetz and Mashaw 1999). But such arguments can logically reinforce 
the free market attacks on welfare and its recipients. The structural barriers that 
often give poor mothers losing choices were frequently constructed as lying 
outside the market—produced by cultural constraints, individual incapacity, 
or exceptional market failures—rather than the product of a political economy 
normally structured to shift  downward much of the costs of work and family 
(McCluskey 2003). If the barriers to choice are viewed as outside the normal 
market, welfare state protections from those bad choices will likewise seem de­
signed to protect people from normal market choices. Free market opponents 
of welfare protections, in contrast, could claim that they were the ones who 
truly respected poor mothers by treating them as capable of making free and 
responsible choices to advance their family’s interests in the market. By con­
structing “liberal” defenders of welfare as denying recipients’ power to choose, 
critics could portray liberal support for welfare as patronizing or even as a form 
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of covert exploitation driven by a wasteful government bureaucracy and self-
serving poverty industry. 
At the same time, this liberal emphasis on welfare recipients’ incapacity for 
good choices reinforced the conservative welfare critics’ arguments for stricter 
government controls on poor mothers’ behavior and for less generous support 
for their families. Popular and political opposition to welfare programs has long 
been fanned by accusations of widespread fraud. Portraying welfare recipients 
as freely rational but immoral actors, reform advocates used racial and sexual 
stereotypes to blame poor mothers for shirking the real costs of their own short-
term, self- centered gain, indulgently choosing laziness over work and sexual 
profligacy or careless pregnancy over marriage while expecting taxpayers or
their children to pick up the costs (Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Gilens 1999). 
In contrast, during the New Deal, advocates of the program that became 
afdc explained that its purpose involved giving poor mothers better choices. 
Focusing on widowed white mothers, proponents emphasized the benefi ts of 
helping white, formerly middle class, women to stay out of wage work to in­
crease maternal time with their children, allowing the family to go to church
together, for example (Solinger 2002). The economic pressure for hasty remar­
riage, dangerous or exploitative work (in factories, farms, or prostitution), with 
children neglected or abandoned to orphanages or to their own work, was not 
in this view the real or necessary price of white widowhood. That is, this view 
of free and responsible choice did not require forcing poor widows to bear the 
market consequences of their irresponsible decision to enjoy the benefi ts of 
children and marriage without accumulating sufficient property wealth, life in­
surance, or paternal health to protect against the economic risks of a breadwin­
ning father’s premature death. Instead, welfare proponents constructed gov­
ernment support for white widows as a way to encourage virtuous maternal 
investment in their children’s well- being for the benefit of society overall. 
If government welfare support is understood to advance rights to better 
market choices, rather than to protect against bad market choices, then the 
recipients of that support will seem more deserving of political power as well 
as market gains. Of course, the question of whose winnings from market and 
political power are natural and normal to a good society, and whose gains are 
artificial and dangerous, will be answered by making moral judgments about 
what and who count in measuring social and personal good. What gets con­
strued as an expansion of market- enhancing choice versus market- inhibiting 
coercion that cannot be a matter of technical cost- benefi t calculation, scientifi c 
laws, supply and demand, or neat separation of economics from politics. As 
afdc became more publicly identified with and available to unmarried moth­
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ers of color, inegalitarian race and gender ideology supported the idea that its 
benefits involve government coercion to protect irresponsible choice to the det­
riment of overall market growth and security. In short, to draw the line between 
choice and coercion, we need to decide who deserves the power to choose, and 
on what terms. 
THE MILITARIZED MARKET IN CRISIS 
Big Losers, Bad Choices 
The 2008 financial market crisis starkly presented the two strategic steps link­
ing market freedom with forceful control. First, it collapsed the market prom­
ise of dazzling expansion of choice into a reality of stunningly losing choices. 
Trillions of dollars of imagined financial and housing market gains evaporated, 
representing not innovative expansion of societal resources, but instead a sys­
tem of speculation that shifted and concealed mounting risk with little sus­
tainable benefit. Former federal banking regulator William K. Black explained 
that this crisis was produced by systemic, normalized fraud at all levels of the 
financial system, as high profits in financial and real estate markets increas­
ingly depended on falsifying and hiding the high risk of loss (Moyers 2009). As 
the smoke and mirrors cleared, many financial institutions, businesses, govern­
ments, individuals, and organizations have been left with high debts and highly 
risky assets now recognized as having low value. In addition to producing these 
losses, the years of heavy investment in illusory, short- term, or narrowly dis­
tributed gains has siphoned off resources from what could have been more se­
cure and widely spread economic growth. 
Although the resulting heightened economic scarcity has exacerbated the 
losing choices for most, some of the central winners from the speculative 
bubble have been treated as too big to fail. Despite the overwhelming biparti­
san unpopularity of fi nancial market bailouts at the end of 2008, political and 
economic leaders confronted the reality that if the major Wall Street players 
were left to pay the bill for their ill- gotten and illusory gains, a bill large enough 
to destroy many existing financial institutions, then Wall Street would bring 
down Main Street along with it. In the current system, Main Streets around 
the world depend on Wall Street for capital and credit. Having and wielding 
market power, after all, means the power to control others’ alternatives so that 
others will have no choice but to pay a high price for what they need. With
Wall Street’s gun at its head, Congressional Democrats and the new Obama 
administration put down their rhetoric of egalitarian economic and political 
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change, and handed over virtually unimaginable amounts of government funds 
and credit to financial institutions that had been involved in producing colossal 
failure.
Along with bad economic choices, this crisis brought glimpses of height­
ened militarization and authoritarian control of the increasing numbers of dev­
astated losers. This rule of force threatens to come at a number of levels. First, 
ongoing military misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, driven in part by po­
litical power to reap private gains from oil, arms sales, and defense contracts, 
present losing choices for those who might be concerned that the price of this 
military action is too high. Once military occupation and destruction has exac­
erbated socioeconomic and political insecurity, the resulting disorder threatens 
to spill over national borders and to fuel the further global growth of warfare
and terror—becoming too big a failure to be abandoned (Scahill 2009). But 
continuing military control off ers little hope of doing anything but increasing 
this threatening insecurity (Gall 2009). At the same time, efforts to address the 
economic crisis through increased funding for the structures that will lead to 
economic growth and security in the United States and beyond are hampered 
by the enormous, continued cost of these military quagmires (Berrigan 2009). 
Second, severe economic devastation is likely to bring despair and the break­
down of security that leads both to a surge in the power of private violence 
to limit peoples’ lives and freedom and also a surge in public force to secure 
against that violence (Klare 2009). A number of mass shootings and murder-
suicides in the United States appear linked to loss of jobs or homes in the crisis. 
Around the globe, economic collapse threatens to exacerbate the decline of the 
power of some nations to effectively control violent drug gangs, warlords, slave 
traffickers, and pirates, leading again to the increased militarization of borders 
and to the militarization of work and business for many. 
Third, as the Wall Street winners walk away from their failures with lavish 
bonuses, some in the United States seek to pin responsibility for massive eco­
nomic failure on the usually suspected losers. Right- wing pundits have heaped 
blame for the underlying mortgage crisis on poor, urban people of color, on 
the dubious theory that liberal government antidiscrimination laws (enacted 
in earlier decades) forced hapless and defenseless bankers to provide irrespon­
sible loans to those undeserving of homeownership. This new mobilization of
timeworn blame may help justify or excuse further policies of punishment and 
control of the racialized poor.
Fourth, the economic crisis brings the risk that it will be more diffi  cult to
mobilize the government resources and power to effectively police the fraudu­
lent risk- shifting that helped to produce the crisis. Government power to hold 
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winners accountable to the law, and to prevent continued coercive winnings, 
may be jeopardized if the crisis increases the concentration of private power to 
control credit. In addition to increasing its political dependence on Wall Street 
financiers, the U.S. government may increase its efforts to seek funds from for­
eign governments whose economic might is partly tied to military power. That
perceived dependence may exacerbate economic pressure to accommodate 
rather than challenge foreign policies undermining political dissent and human 
rights. Again, the result could be increasing unequal international and national 
policing of vulnerable market losers in a context where winners remain above 
the law.
Controlling Winners, Becoming Choosers 
To solve the financial crisis, many free market advocates admit the need for 
new government funding and regulation, but they tend to advocate structuring 
that intervention to better enhance the power of market winners to withstand 
market cycles or “systemic” risk (Posner 2009). In the free market story, gov­
ernment support that strengthens the market must be sharply distinguished 
from government intervention that overpowers the market. Although that line 
between supporting and supplanting the market seems to protect individual 
choice from government power, it instead reserves government backing for the 
power to choose as an elite privilege. 
To increase winning choices for those losing out in the recent crisis, market 
regulation would need to affirmatively create alternatives to existing market 
power. As long as the large banks, insurers, and other fi nancial institutions 
control the supply of credit and capital, for example, then they will be able to
continue to shift much of the costs of their gain to those who depend on that
supply. If government financial backing simply replenishes the supply of credit 
and capital of existing institutions without major changes in control, it is likely 
that the credit supply will continue to be in need of further government replen­
ishing. That funding is likely to be directed toward continuing to secure short-
term returns for managers and investors at the expense of others. 
If government is in fact a vital supplier of the credit needed to stabilize the 
market, then the price of that credit could be cheaper if the government supply 
were structured to effectively compete against, rather than cooperate with, 
those large failed institutions. It is logically possible, for example, that a govern­
ment competitor could reduce risks through greater transparency and greater 
checks on illusory and fraudulent gains, and to prioritize sustainable gains to 
borrowers and society rather than short- term gains to managers and investors. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
42 • Martha T. McCluskey 
That public financial competitor could come in a variety of forms, such as new 
public financial institutions, increased government control and redirection of 
private institutions receiving government funds, or redirection of government 
funding toward smaller, specialized banks and other institutions designed to 
serve small business development and homeowners more than wealthy specu­
lators.
However, the free market rhetoric celebrating choice and consumer sover­
eignty is not so easily turned toward policies that would meaningfully improve 
the choices for most borrowers and taxpayers. Despite the logic of joining public 
control to public funding, the free market story emphasizes that concentrated 
private power is necessary for economic growth, because democratic govern­
ment can only create the illusion of abundance. In this theory, the market forces 
real and responsible choices because it is driven by natural laws of supply and 
demand rather than by political artifice. It warns that government control by 
definition avoids hard choices, giving into irrational demands of special inter­
ests to increase waste and scarcity in the long run. For example, this theory sug­
gests that although populist outrage might push government- controlled fi nan­
cial institutions to cut executive compensation, if that compensation is below 
the presumed market price for skilled leadership, then it will lead to incompe­
tent managers who will squander resources in the long run. Or, more plausibly, 
it cautions that government-controlled financial institutions will be induced to 
steer credit toward powerful political players and their constituents, regardless 
of real risk, diverting investment away from the most productive uses likely to 
increase and spread economic growth. 
Despite dampened faith that the market naturally corrects private managers 
and investors who pursue short- term gains without regard for long- term costs, 
the free market story nonetheless presents this market failure as an aberration 
set apart from and against a norm of government failure. As a result, the pre­
vailing regulatory response to the crisis has been to concentrate more control 
in a federal super- regulator protecting the super- financiers rather than to break
up and segregate financial institutions so that they are more amenable to trans­
parent and democratic regulation (Greider 2009, 2010). 
The free market story rejects expanded and improved private choices, as 
well as expanded democratic control, on the theory that the benefits of the 
free market depend on controlling the bargaining power of nonelites. An­
other economic policy reform recently before Congress has been the Employee
Free Choice Act, which would provide for unionization based on a process of 
signing membership cards rather than an electoral process regulated to give 
employers more power to contest and control union organizing eff orts. Op­
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position to that law has gained broad political legitimacy based on arguments 
that increased unionization violates natural scarcity. According to legal expert 
Richard Epstein, this increased choice—and power —for workers will increase
capital flight, thereby hurting not just politicians’ campaign financing but also 
destroying jobs and depressing wages (Epstein 2009). 
In effect, such arguments naturalize a given distribution of political and 
economic bargaining power as a mysterious, but ultimately benefi cial, market 
transcending human intentions. That is, these arguments suggest that true free­
dom of choice for most consists of ceding power to make meaningful choices, 
submitting to the control of those with the most power to gain at most oth­
ers’ expense. This perverse conclusion follows from the theory that those elite 
gains naturally and normally represent the natural, normally benefi cial moral, 
economic, and political order. That grim “choice” to lose meaningful choices 
retains substantial power to win popular appeal and expert approval because of 
a lack of faith in alternatives. In the face of concentrated and globalized market 
power, government promises of increased abundance often seem hollow. 
This embrace of the market’s losing choices out of a sense of ultimate choice­
lessness stems from an assumption that real power is beyond the control of
democratic politics or law. The possibility that government can produce abun­
dance—better choices —depends on the government being able to shift its 
power from controlling market losers to extending the rule of law over power­
ful economic winners. Fostering and sustaining better choices requires not just 
providing and controlling an alternative supply of resources, but also increasing 
democratic political control over the economic institutions that structure the 
market. 
The recent financial crisis has reinforced cynicism about the possibilities for 
popular control, since it underscores the extent to which government, experts, 
debtors, and investors all can be swayed or misled into mistaking highly con­
centrated short- term gains to elites for broad- based security and prosperity. 
But the real alternative to the threat of undemocratic government power is not 
an imaginary free market beyond human agency, but instead a government 
and economy directly structured to enhance democratic ends. When political 
leaders assure us that public funding of private businesses such as American In­
ternational Group or General Motors will not lead to public control, they evoke 
the Lochner era’s passive idea of democracy. In that ideology, government ac­
tion that sought better choices was itself a sign of dependency deserving of 
control and exclusion more than economic and political power. 
Ironically, acquiescence in the market’s bad choices has sometimes become a 
superficial badge of deserving citizenship status, differentiating market players 
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who can dream of winning big from the real losers outside the game. A culture 
of white masculine military toughness can reinforce the idea that accepting 
rather than resisting losing choices is a sign of mature and rational indepen­
dence. In this culture, choosing to lose rather than to change the rules in a game 
with others who are more powerful makes one a good sport, deserving of the 
approval of those with greater strength. In contrast, the prevailing culture oft en 
disparages government protection against economic insecurity as a feminized 
and racialized “nanny state” in which better economic choices became unre­
alistic or perverse nursery tales appropriate for “girlie men” not capable of he­
roic self- sacrifice (McCluskey 2007). For example, campaigning for Republican 
nominee John McCain in the 2008 presidential election, California Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger used images of feminized physical weakness—such as 
“skinny legs”—to mock opponent Obama’s allegedly egalitarian economic poli­
cies as “unaffordable” and unsuitable for an “action hero” like McCain (Cam­
panile 2008). 
This sense of choicelessness pervaded the recent debate over health insur­
ance, an urgently gaping hole in the U.S. welfare state that has widened as jobs 
providing private health insurance become more scarce in the wake of the fi ­
nancial crisis. Supporters of President Obama’s health insurance reform initia­
tive debated the question of creating a public option to compete with private 
insurance instead of simply expanding government support for the private 
insurers who have largely failed to provide adequate, affordable coverage. By 
framing public health insurance as an additional choice, proponents of the 
public option appropriated the market rhetoric that had helped undermine 
previous reform eff orts. 
In response, opponents of the public insurance alternative warned that de­
parting from the free market threatens individual choice by off ering choices 
that challenge the natural scarcity that supposedly brings real security. For ex­
ample, prominent economist Gregory Mankiw criticized the idea that a public 
health insurance option might be able to provide better and cheaper coverage 
for most people (Mankiw 2009). He admitted that government health insur­
ance, like Medicare, can produce major administrative savings, potentially in­
creasing resources for health care. Furthermore, he emphasized that a govern­
ment health insurer would be likely to reduce costs by wielding greater market 
bargaining power over health care providers. Nonetheless, using the standard
argument of false abundance, Mankiw suggested that the “choice” to buy more
health care at lower cost to patients would nonetheless be an irresponsible de­
nial of market scarcity. Because some health care providers could lose money,
and because some of those providers might have the power to protect their 
interests by reducing the quality or quantity of their services, he concluded that 
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consumers would have worse choices in the end. His analysis assumed that the 
current prices charged by health care providers are natural, necessary, com­
petitive, and beneficial to consumers (and providers) rather than the result of
unequal public and private bargaining power by private insurance companies 
and specialized medical providers largely protected against competition and 
innovation. He raised the specter of government rationing to explain why we 
cannot expect much better choices from government reform of the health in­
surance market. 
To create a political culture where government action for better choices ap­
pears more credible and more powerful, it will be necessary to challenge not 
only the naturalization of scarcity, but also the naturalization of economic los­
ers as moral failures undeserving of better choices in a better economic and 
political game. The moral problem with Lochner was not simply that unelected 
judges imposed a normative preference for economic growth over equality—a 
policy choice better left to democratic process—rather, the Lochner era rulings 
were problematic in their moral belief that ordinary workers or consumers did 
not normally deserve to have equal legal power to control economic growth for 
their own interests. Similarly, tanf’s rejection of the New Deal era’s support
for some single mothers reflects the moral and political idea that poor single 
mothers do not deserve to assert power at work and in the family (drawing on
racial and sexual ideology), not a new emphasis on market choice over gov­
ernment protection. In the recent health insurance reform debate, “tea party” 
activists joined economic experts in insisting that freedom and dignity for most 
requires accepting the current situation of costly, scarce, and insecure health 
insurance protection. Finally, the losing choices presented to the general public 
in response to the recent financial crisis likewise depend on the construction 
of a public consisting of voters, workers, and consumers who are not deserving 
of the responsibility and power to choose—and so must have their organized 
power subject to the control of elite others, whether in a super- regulator or 
supervised union election. 
In contrast, as a number of countries in Latin America have recently emerged 
from military control to greater democracy, their leaders have asserted polit­
ical, legal, and cultural power to claim better economic choices for more of 
their citizens. Resisting the ideology of scarcity imposed by market and moral 
fundamentalism, these countries now provide a range of possible examples of
democratic efforts to change the rules of law and market to seize public con­
trol of natural resources, and to organizing alternative supplies of credit and 
investment to increase the power to bargain for a greater share of the gains of 
economic development. 
In conclusion, the rhetorical and ideological separation of the market from 
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government helps legitimate constraints on meaningful individual choice by
naturalizing control and coercion as the result of beneficial and liberating eco­
nomic forces. Substituting overt government power and control for the illusion 
of natural market freedom does not, however, necessarily bring the increased 
freedom and security of better choices for most. Government involvement 
in the financial crisis, in health care, and in welfare programs is not naturally 
separate or separable from coercive and unequal market bargaining power any 
more than the market is separate from government. 
To undo the two strategic steps whereby public and private structures pro­
duce losing choices and pressure for increased control of those who bear those 
losses, we must translate the question of choice into a question of power. The 
Lochner era rulings were wrong because they presented power as a matter of 
freedom from coercion separate from the freedom to organize, institutional­
ize, and regulate the rules determining the terms and boundaries of individual 
choices. Government regulation of the market has often failed to provide better 
choices— whether for workers, single mothers, or borrowers— not because that
intervention has been coercive or paternalistic, and not because better choices 
inevitably lie outside human power. Instead, effective policies providing better 
choices and more capacity for freedom require structures aimed at changing 
the power to bargain for a greater share of resources both in state and market. 
Those policies of better choices require challenging a moral order in which 
economic vulnerability is linked to moral, legal, and political incapacity. More
equal government economic security is compatible with, and indeed necessary 
for, more political and economic freedom. Achieving both freedom and secu­
rity depends on a legal system structured to assume more equal authority to 
have better choices and more equal responsibility for choosing to gain in ways 
that minimize others’ losses. 
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